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This paper investigates efficiency using data envelopment analysis (DEA) and 
productivity growth using Malmquist index in a sample of Indian commercial 
banks over the period 1995-2002. Using total deposits and operating expenses as 
input and loans and other earning assets as output in the DEA analysis we 
observe no significant growth in productivity during the sampled period.  The 
rate of increase in technical efficiency though small is likely to be due to scale 
efficiency compared to managerial efficiency. In general, smaller banks are less 
efficient and highly DEA-efficient banks have a high equity to assets and high 
return to average equity ratios. There has been no growth in productivity in 
private sector banks where as the public sector banks appears to demonstrate a 
modest positive change through 1995-2002. Technological change in the public 
sector banks reveals a growth while the private sector banks experienced a 
negative growth of almost the same magnitude. 
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1.  Introduction 
Examining banking performance has been a common practice among many banking and finance 
researchers for a number of years.  The main reason for continued interest in this area of research 
is the ever changing banking business environment throughout the world. With the introduction 
of financial deregulation in many parts of the world, the effect of such deregulation on bank 
efficiency has become an important issue. Financial deregulation was first introduced in 
developed countries. Therefore, most studies on the effect of deregulation on bank productivity 
have been confined to the developed world. Non-availability of data is another reason for the 
dearth of literature on the impact of financial deregulation on the performance of the banking 
sector in developing countries. Many countries that adopted financial deregulation policies are 
now experiencing competitive banking practices. India is no exception and as an emerging market 
is becoming a competitive and important market not only for financial products but also for other 
products. Indian banking is a considerable component in Asian financial affairs and has not been 
subjected to substantial research compared to the countries in the developed world.  
A few studies assessed Indian bank performance using the data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
technique- a nonparametric methodology to evaluate the relative efficiency of production units 
and can accommodate multiple inputs and outputs. For example, Bhattacharyya, Lovell and 
Sahay (1997) examined the productive efficiency of Indian commercial banks during 1986-1991 
and reported a marginal increase in overall average performance after 1987 and the average 
efficiency of publicly owned banks is much higher than in the privately owned or foreign owned 
banks.  Sathya (2001) compared productive efficiency of publicly owned, privately owned and 
foreign owned banks operational in India in the year 1997/1998 and reported that private sector 
commercial banks as a group is paradoxically lower than that of public sector and foreign banks. 
These studies differ from each other in at least two ways: (i) the time period captured in the   3
analysis and (ii) the input-output variables used in the DEA model.
1 Shanmugam and Das (2004) 
on the other hand investigated the efficiency of Indian commercial banks during the reform 
period, 1992-1999 using a parametric methodology.
2 They observed that the state and foreign 
banks are more efficient than their counterparts namely, nationalised and privately owned 
domestic banks. 
  As efficient banking systems contribute in an extensive way for higher economic growth in 
any country, studies in this nature are very important for policy makers, industry leaders and 
many others who are reliant on the banking sector. This study fulfils a demanding gap in that case 
and attempts to examine the performance in commercial banks after implementing significant 
financial deregulation policies since 1980s. For this study, the chosen time period is 1995-2002 as 
the deregulation process began in India much later. The sample period 1995-2002 includes sub-
periods that were favourable and unfavourable to banking institutions in India. Our aim is to 
examine if these changing conditions (i) have any impact on bank performance in general and (ii) 
impact differently on the banks with different characteristics and efficiency levels. Specifically, 
we will be interested in determining whether unfavourable conditions exacerbate the difference in 
efficiency between low and high performing financial institutions. We use the DEA technique to 
measure bank efficiency and the Malmquist index to assess productivity change. 
  Rest of the paper is as follows: Section2 examines the Indian commercial banking briefly; 
Section 3 discusses the methodology of the study; Section 4 details out variables and the data 
                                                 
1 See Sathya (2001) for a demonstration of the change in efficiency scores when inputs are changed. 
2 Parametric methods are used to estimate the frontier with an explicit functional form given. These types 
of frontier estimation methods fall under stochastic frontier estimation (SFE) methods. The SFE method 
largely depends on the industry under study as well as data availability. An advantage of using the SFE 
method is that it can handle stochastic noise. However, the requirement of a priori (explicit) specification 
of the production function and assumption of distributions for the error term without regard to the theory 
are considered as shortcomings in stochastic frontier methods. 
   4
used in the study; the results are discussed in Section 5 explains results; and Section 6 concludes 
the study.   
 
2. Indian banking at a glance 
The Indian financial system has been regulated for most of its existence. The main regulatory 
features were interest rate regulation, credit restrictions, equity market controls and foreign 
exchange controls. Though some restrictions are still in operation, regulations, which are 
affecting banks, are being relaxed after implementing the Narasimhan Committee Report (1991). 
The second phase of deregulation has been completed after the review report by the same 
Narasimhan Committee. The 1985 report of the committee to review the working of the monetary 
system and the 1987 report by Vaghul that examined the Indian money market activities are 
among the important reports, which contributed to the present deregulation in India.  
  It is important to note that none of the deregulatory measures implemented were strong 
enough to diminish the important role played by the largely inefficient public sector banks. While 
there are some improvements within the sector, the overall inefficiency remained the same 
(Verma Report, 1999).  One of the stumbling blocks towards full deregulation may be the public 
sector banks which are not open for full scale competition. One significant reason why the Indian 
public sector banks are able to survive even while making losses is the stringent regulations 
imposed on general economic activities of the country. As a result of deregulation private sector 
institutions are growing rapidly however, major commercial banks and specialised institutions 
still remain within the public sector.  
India has more than sixty-six thousand branches, of which sixty percent are in rural areas. 
This may be due to geographic factors, but is not necessarily a valid reason to justify having such 
a large number of branches. Of the 298 commercial banks in India, the regional rural banks 
account for sixty-six percent. The public sector banks account for approximately eighty percent of 
the total assets of the banking and financial institutions sector, while the private sector banks and   5
foreign banks each account for eight percent of the total assets. Table 2 shows the current state of 
the largest ten commercial banks in India. In terms of the asset base the State Bank of India is the 
largest commercial bank in the country and ranks 158 in the world.  
 
3. Methodology 
The term ‘productive efficiency’ is commonly used to describe the level of performance of a 
production unit in terms of its utilisation of input resources in generating outputs. Koopmans 
(1951) defined technical efficiency as a feasible input/output vector where it is technologically 
impossible to increase any output without simultaneously reducing another output. This analogy 
holds for a reduction in any input or both a reduction in any input and an increase in any output. 
Farrell (1957) demonstrated that a production unit ‘overall efficiency’ is composed of two 
separate efficiency measures called ‘technical efficiency’ and ‘allocative efficiency’. Farrell 
measured technical inefficiency as the maximum equi-proportional reduction in all inputs 
consistent with equivalent production of observed output. A Farrell efficient unit however, may 
not be Koopmans efficient since even after Farrell efficiency is achieved, there may exist 
additional slack in individual inputs. Allocative efficiency is based on cost considerations namely 
input prices. The type of efficiency measured depends on the data availability and appropriate 
behavioural assumptions (Yin, 1999). When only quantities are available, technical efficiency can 
be calculated. When both, quantities and prices are available, economic efficiency can be 
calculated and decomposed into technical and allocative components.  
 
3.1 Data envelopment analysis 
Speaking broadly, the DEA technique defines an efficiency measure of a production unit by its 
position relative to the frontier of the best performance established mathematically by the ratio of 
weighted sum of outputs to weighted sum of inputs; see, for example, Norman and Stoker (1991) 
for a detail description of the DEA technique. The estimated frontier of the best performance is   6
also referred to as efficient frontier or envelopment surface. The frontier of the best performance 
characterises the efficiency of production units and identifies inefficiencies based on known 
levels of attainment. Thus, a production unit attains 100% efficiency only when it is not found to 
be inefficient in using the inputs to generate the output when compared with other relevant 
production units. 
The original formulation of the DEA model introduced by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes 
(1978), denoted CCR hereafter, assume CRS and the production frontier is a piecewise linear 
envelopment surface.  
Let us first define the following measures:   
   {} s S ,..., 1 =  is the set of outputs considered in the analysis 
{} m M ,... 1 =  is the set of inputs considered in the analysis 
rj y = known positive output level of production unit j,  S r ∈  
ij x = known positive input level of production unit j,  M i∈  
  n = total number of production units evaluated 
An interpretation of the CCR model that estimates the proportional increase θ , in all outputs 
required to achieve efficiency in DMU ‘k’ is given by     














ij j x x ≤ ∑
=1
λ ,  m i ,..., 2 , 1 =  
0 ≥ j λ .  n j ,..., 2 , 1 =    7
The variables in the CCR model are  k µ  and  j λ . The sufficient condition for efficiency of DMU 
‘k’ is that the optimum value of  k µ   is 1. Otherwise, it is labelled as inefficient compared to other 
DMUs in the sample. The constraints in the model ensure that relative technical efficiency of 
DMU ‘k’, given by  k µ   never exceeds 1. In the CRS model, the technical efficiency estimated 
with input and output orientation is the same. The optimal value of µ  will be the Farrell 
(technical) efficiency. A DEA run involves solving the above model n times, once for each DMU 
analysed. 
  The measure of efficiency obtained from the solution to model (1) consists of two 
components: ‘pure’ technical efficiency and scale efficiency. Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984)
 
proposed the variable-returns-to-scale (VRS) version of the model (1), denoted as BCC hereafter. 
The BCC model is (1) together with the additional constraint 







1 λ ,                                                                  (2) 
that captures returns to scale characteristics. Hence, the efficiency estimates obtained in the BCC 
model is net of the contribution of scale economies and therefore is referred to as ‘pure’ technical 
efficiency and also as the managerial efficiency. 
The orientation of the model given in (1) is output augmentation since it provides information 
as to how much equi-proportional increase in output is necessary (while maintaining levels of 
input) for an inefficient unit to become DEA-efficient. Under CRS specification, input and output 
orientation provides identical DEA estimates. More over, the efficiency frontier estimated with 
input and output orientation DEA models is the same. Therefore, under VRS specification both 
types of orientation will produce the same set of efficient DMUs. Under VRS, the estimated 
efficiency of inefficient DMUs can differ between the orientations adopted.  
A DEA run will produce a relative efficiency score,µ  and a set of  j λ , n j ,..., 2 , 1 =  values 
for each production unit. In the DEA literature, the units evaluated are referred to as decision-  8
making units (DMUs). The set of  j λ  values of each unit defines a point on the envelopment 
surface
3 made up of a convex combination of the efficient units. Therefore, for an inefficient unit, 
the point so defined by the  j λ  values becomes a role model that in turn establishes precedence 
for it to become efficient. The set of efficient production units {j: 0 > j λ } is called the peer group 
of the designated unit, ‘k’. 
The constraint given in (2) is referred to as the convexity constraint and accounts for VRS. 
BCC model measures technical efficiency only. Hence, the efficiency estimates obtained in the 
BCC model may be considered as “pure” technical efficiency estimates. When the convexity 
constraint is removed the resulting model represents the CRS situation. The relative efficiency 
score obtained for a designated unit under CRS is a measure of overall technical efficiency of the 
unit and is always at least as much as the corresponding value obtained under VRS. The relative 
efficiency score obtained under VRS is a measure of pure technical efficiency. The difference in 
overall and pure technical efficiencies is attributed to scale efficiency. A measure of scale 
efficiency is simply the ratio of overall and pure technical efficiencies.  
 
3.2 Malmquist productivity index 
 
Malmquist productivity index is defined using distance functions. Suppose the function that 
describes the technology of production is given as:  ( ) 0 , = Y X F  where  ( ) M x x x X ,..., , 2 1 =  is the 
input vector and  ( ) S y y y Y ,..., , 2 1 =  is the output vector. Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982) 
provided an alternative interpretation of production technology using the concept of ‘distance 







⎛ = 0 , : ) , ( 0 µ µ
µ
Y X F Min Y X D  
where  Y µ  is the minimum equi-proportional change in the output vector. The output distance 
                                                 
3 Efficient units determine a piecewise linear envelopment surface. The entire mean variance frontier also 
may be generated by linear combinations of any frontier portfolios (Cass and Stiglitz, 1970).   9
function measures the maximum proportional change in output required to place () Y X,  on the 
efficiency frontier. If the evaluated production unit is efficient,  () 1 , 0 = Y X D  
otherwise, () 1 , 0 < Y X D . Distance function may also be computed with input orientation, 
reference technology in a certain time period and CRS or VRS specification. Let  () CRS D
t
0  and 
() VRS D
t
0  denote the output distance function computed with period t technology and with CRS 
and VRS specification respectively. The distance function can be determined using the DEA 
methodology outlined in section 3.1.  
Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982) defines the output based Malmquist productivity 
index to compare performance of a production unit in time period t and t+1 with reference to 
period t technology as 
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Alternatively we may define output based Malmquist productivity index with reference to period 
t+1 technology as 
























+ =                                            (4) 
1 0 > M  indicates higher productivity in period t than in period t+1.  
Fare, Grosskopf, Norris and Zhang (1994) defines an index that incorporates Malmquist indices 
in both periods. This they suggest to avoid choice of the time period arbitrarily. Fare, Grosskopf, 
Norris and Zhang specifies the output based Malmquist productivity change index
4 as 
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4 This is the geometric mean of output based Malmquist productivity indices with reference to period t and 
period t+1 technology.   10
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 is the change in relative technical efficiency between periods t and t+1 

























































 captures the shift in technology (technological 
change) between the two time periods evaluated at  ( ) t t Y X ,   and ( ) 1 1, + + t t Y X . 
Now, for each production unit, define five Malmquist indices for period t+1 relative to period 
t: 
Total factor productivity change index (TFPCI)         
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Technical efficiency change index (TECI) =  ( )( )




Y X CRS D








                                            (9) 
Pure technical efficiency change index (PTECI) =  ( )( )
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Scale efficiency change index (SECI) = 
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A value of less than 1 in the index indicates a decline in efficiency, equal to 1 indicates stagnation 
and greater than 1 indicates a growth between period t and t+1 from the perspective of period t 
technology.    
 
4. Variables and data 
Variable selection 
 
The choice of the variable set in DEA is an empirical issue. Inclusion of many variables is not a 
viable option in DEA as the number of variables in the model increases, more and more 
production units become efficient. On the other hand, when relevant variables are omitted DEA 
underestimates efficiency and the effect of this is more severe than when irrelevant variables are 
included in the DEA model. Lack of a standard structured approach to variable selection in DEA 
makes the task of variable selection even more difficult.   
  Berger and Humphrey (1997) commented on the difficulty of variable selection in 
performance appraisal of banks using the DEA technique as: there is no ‘perfect approach’ on the 
explicit definition and measurement of banks’ input and outputs. In choosing the variables, there 
are some restrictions on the type of variables since there is a need for comparable data and to 
minimise possible bias arising from different accounting practices even among the banks that are 
bounded by federal bank guidelines. Indian banks are no exception.  
  There are two common approaches to variable selection in bank performance appraisal in 
DEA: intermediation approach and production approach
5. In the intermediation approach where 
the banks are considered as intermediaries, the role of deposits is considered as an input to the 
production process where as in the production approach where the banks are considered as 
service providers, the deposits are considered as an output involving the creation of value added 
for which customers bear an opportunity cost. Casu and Molineux (1999) argued that the 
                                                 
5 Another approach is to treat financial products on their net contribution to the revenue of the bank. In this 
case a financial product may be classified as an input or an output depending on the net contribution.    12
intermediation approach may be superior for evaluating the importance of frontier efficiency to 
the profitability of financial institutions because minimisation of total costs is needed to maximise 
profits and not just minimisation of production costs alone. Besides, interest expenses often 
account for one-half to two-thirds of total costs that the production approach ignores. The 
intermediate approach accommodates interest expenses. The choice of the appropriate input-
output variable selection approach could be based on the aim of the analysis as well. Grifell-Tatjé 
and Lovell (1997) argued that when the interest in the analysis is on bank productivity, the 
production approach is preferred to the other approaches as they essentially focus on bank 
profitability. The sets of input-output variables considered in some previous DEA studies of 
Indian bank efficiency are shown in Table 1. Following Casu and Molineux (1999) we specify 
two inputs: x1= total deposits (customer and short term funding) and x2= total operating expenses 
and two outputs: y1= loans and y2= other earning assets. 
 
Sample data  
The data for this study was obtained from the BankScope database. The sample period we 
consider is 1995-2002. The reason for our choice of this sample period is that significant impact 
of deregulation began to appear on Indian banking only in mid 90s. The database provided 
useable data on the input-output variables only on 40 banks over the sample period. The sample 
consists of seventeen public and twenty-three private banks. The names of the banks are given in 
Table 5. 
  Table 3 gives the minimum, median, maximum and the average of each input-output variable, 
for each year. The percentage change in the average from the average of the previous year is also 
shown in Table 3. It is apparent from the entries in Table 8 that the average loans grew steadily 
by about 8 percent from 1996 to 1988 and in 1999 the growth rate jumped to more 18 percent. 
The other earning assets average also increased from 1995 to 1999 by about 11 percent per 
annum and then the rate of increase dropped to below 3.5 percent in 2000 and appears to be   13
growing since. The average total operating expenses in 1996 was below that of 1995. However 
after 1996 the average increased rapidly over the next four years to over 17 percent in 2000. The 
year 2001 witnessed a sharp decline in total operating expenses from the previous year but in 
2002 the average increased by more than 15 percent. Customer and short term funding grew in 
each year with high percentage increases (over 15 percent) recorded in 1999 and 2002. Overall 
2000 and 2001 appear to show some activity in the banking sector different from the other 
observed sample periods. Table 3 entries also reveal that the minimum of the input and output 
variables increased in each year from 1996 to 2001 and decreased in 2002. On further 
investigation of the data set we noted that the minimum values of the input-output variables in all 
years correspond to Ratnakar Bank and SBI Commercial and International Bank with 1995 being 
an exception. 
 
5. Results and discussion 
5.1 DEA efficiency 
We computed the technical efficiency score with the CRS specification (Model given in (1)) and 
‘pure’ technical efficiency with the VRS output orientation (BCC model outlined in Section 3.1) 
and VRS input orientation specification. The annual average, median, standard deviation (SD), 
first-quartile (Q1) and third-quartile (Q3) of DEA-efficiency distributions of all the banks and 
after separating them into two groups: private and public is reported in Table 4. 
  First, we discuss the results of both private and public banks combined. The results are 
reported in Panel C, Table 4. Under the CRS assumption, the average efficiency of the forty 
banks increased from 1995 through 1997 and declined there after until 1999. A slight 
improvement in average efficiency was observed in 2000 followed by a decrease in 2001 and an 
increase in 2002. The change in average efficiency under the VRS assumption is similar to those 
with the CRS assumption.    14
  It should be noted here that the figures reported in Table 4 should not be compared across 
years as DEA measures relative efficiency and not absolute efficiency.
6 A higher value of average 
efficiency does not imply higher average performance compared to the performance with respect 
to a lower average efficiency. Overall, the technical efficiency of Indian commercial banks is 
approximately 0.92 where as the managerial efficiency is approximately 0.96. These values are 
high compared to the average efficiency reported in similar studies of banks in India and in other 
countries.
7 The differences in the estimated efficiency between studies can be due to many 
reasons: variation in (i) the best-practice frontier, (ii) the input-output variable set used in the 
DEA model, (iii) the time period captured in the analysis and (iv) characteristics of the sampled 
banks.
8    
                                                 
6 DEA efficiency is measured relative to the observed best-practice frontier and therefore, the frontier can 
change from year to year.  
7 For example, Casu and Molyneux (1999) considered the same set of input-output variables as in this study 
and reported that the mean DEA efficiency of five European countries lies between 0.50 and 0.66. 
Bhattacharyya, Lovell and Sahay (1997) examined the productive efficiency of Indian commercial banks 
during 1986-1991 and reported that the annual average varied between 0.79 and 0.83, the average 
efficiency of publicly owned banks averaged between 0.82 and 0.90 and in the privately and foreign owned 
banks the average varied between 0.74 and 0.78 and 0.68 and 0.82 respectively.  Sathya (2001) compared 
productive efficiency of banks operational in India in the year 1997/1998. Sathya (2001) considered two 
sets of input-output variables (see Table 1) thereby estimating the efficiency with two DEA models and 
reported that in one model the mean efficiency is 0.83 and in the other the mean efficiency is 0.62 
highlighting the possibility of obtaining different efficiency estimates when alternative sets of inputs are 
used. 
8 Outliers can influence efficiency measurement in DEA. As far as we are aware no DEA study of the 
Indian banking sector discusses the results to the presence of outliers. Following previous studies (see, for 
example, Resti (1997) and Casu and Molyneux (1999)) a reduced sample for each year was obtained by 
eliminating the efficient banks when all the 40 banks were included in the analysis. When the efficient 
banks are removed the remaining banks form a new frontier. Having solved the DEA model again for each 
of the reduced samples we computed one-way correlations between the newly obtained relative efficiency 
scores and the corresponding relative efficiency scores obtained when all 40 banks were used. The 
correlation between relative efficiency scores obtained in the reduced sample and the relative efficiencies   15
  The results in Panels A and B indicate that the technical efficiency of banks in the private and 
public sector in general are the same. Managerial efficiency of the public sector banks however is 
higher than their private sector counterparts. This is observed in the input and output orientation 
models.  
  We investigate the composition of the efficiency frontier next. Tables 5 and 6 show the banks 
that lie on the efficiency frontier under the CRS and VRS with output orientation assumption 
respectively. Table 5 displays a change in the composition of the efficiency frontier with the 
number of 100 percent efficient banks varying between five and ten with the number increasing in 
the last three years. In the years 1995-2000 the private sector banks dominated the CRS frontier. 
Thereafter, the distribution of the private and public sector banks that makes up the frontier is 
even. Fifty-percent of the banks have never been observed efficient compared to the others in the 
sample. Only five banks appeared efficient in at least four of the eight years observed. 
  On the other hand, Table 6 entries indicate that the best-practice VRS efficiency frontier is 
made up by more than thirty-five percent of the sampled banks.
9 In this case nine banks never 
made it to the frontier of which eight belongs to the private sector and one to the public sector. 
This clearly indicates the dominance of the VRS frontier by the public sector banks.
10 Further, 
eighteen banks of which ten belongs to the public sector are efficient in at least four of the eight 
sampled years and three banks namely, Bank of India, Ratnakar Bank Ltd and SBI Commercial & 
International Bank remained efficient in all years sampled.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
obtained in the original sample is considered as an indicator of the robustness of the results. Our results 
reveal that the DEA output is not sensitive to the presence of outliers. 
9 Bhattacharyya, Lovell and Sahay (1997) in their study of Indian commercial banks report that 
approximately ten percent of their sample is DEA-efficient. 
10 These nine banks that are not on the efficiency frontier in any sampled year under the VRS specification 
also are not on the CRS frontier in any year.   16
5.2 Technical efficiency versus performance indicators and size 
In each year of study, we sorted the banks into four groups of equal size by their efficiency score 
and computed the average efficiency of the banks within each group. The groups are labelled as 
least efficient, low-medium efficient, medium-high efficient and most efficient. The averages are 
displayed in Figure 1. The curves shown in Figure 1 reveal that there is no distinguishable 
difference in average efficiency between the medium-high and most efficient banks. Hence these 
two groups are combined and referred to as highly efficient in the investigation of technical 
efficiency with two performance indicators: return on average equity (ROAE) and equity/total 
assets. The technical efficiency within four asset classes is also discussed in this section. 
 
Return on average equity  
As shown in Figure 2, the average ROAE of the banks in the least efficient group is higher than 
the medium efficiency group and in turn the average ROAE of the medium efficiency group is 
higher than the most efficient group in 1996 and 1997. This status started to change in 1988 such 
that in 2001 and 2002 the highest average ROAE is with the most efficient banks followed by the 
low-medium and the least efficient banks. 
 
Equity/total assets 
The second measure of performance considered is the ratio of equity to total assets. The results 
reported in Figure 3 reveals that this ratio with the most efficient banks remained the highest in all 
the sampled years except 1988 where the ratio of the medium banks was slightly higher. In 
general, medium to high efficiency banks always appear to maintain a high equity to assets ratio 
and the least efficient banks the lowest ratio with the exception in 1997. 
 
 
   17
Size 
The average efficiency of banks in four groups where the groups are formed according to size of 
the bank as measured by total assets is presented in Figure 4. An analysis of efficiency by asset 
size reveals that in each year, the largest banks appear to be the most technically efficient. In 
general, the smaller banks appear to be less efficient than the others.
11  
 
5.3 Productivity change 
In this section we discuss productivity change as measured by the Malmquist total factor 
productivity index and assign the change in total factor productivity to technical and/or 
technological change. We also attempt to attribute any change in technical efficiency to change in 
pure technical efficiency and/or scale efficiency change. The average annual values of TFPCI, 
TCI, TECI, PTECI and SECI for the year 1996 to 2002 are reported in Table 7. All the indices are 
relative to the previous year and therefore, there are no figures available for the year 1995.  
The results in the analysis with all the banks reported in Panel C, Table 7 indicate that there 
was no significant growth in productivity (0.6 percent per year) during the sample period 1995 
and 2002. Indian commercial banks experienced a 5.8 percent productivity growth in 1996 and in 
the following two years productivity declined by approximately 0.5 percent per year suggesting 
deterioration in bank performance in 1997 and 1998. One possibility for this deterioration could 
be the Asian financial crisis experienced throughout the region during this time period. In 1999 
the commercial banking sector defied the negative trend in growth in previous years but only 
marginally to be followed by another two years of decline at approximately 1.4 percent per year. 
The percentage growth in productivity in 2002 was 1.5 percent. 
Over the sample period the average annual rate of technical efficiency change is 1.7 percent 
where as the rate of technological change is -1.1 percent. Therefore, we infer that the average 
                                                 
11 In an analysis of commercial US banks from 184-1998 reveals that the smallest institutions are the most 
efficient and the largest ones are the least efficient (Barr, Killgo, Siems and Zimmel, 19999).    18
increase in productivity, though modest, is due to the improvement in technical efficiency though 
the change is inconsistent over the seven year period such that a growth is observed in 1996, 
1997, 2000 and 2002 where as in the rest of the years, technical efficiency declined from the 
previous year. 
Pure technical efficiency -that measures performance only due to managerial activity- 
increased by a mere 0.1 percent per year. This low average is due to the large variation in the 
change in managerial efficiency through the years with the lowest decline at 1.8 percent in 2002 
and the largest increase of 1.7 percent in 1997. Scale efficiency of the banks on the other hand 
grew on average by 1.6 percent per year. The observed rate of increase in technical efficiency 
therefore may be considered to be due to scale efficiency compared to managerial efficiency.  
 
Private vs public banks 
  We repeated the above analysis for the private and public banks separately. The results in 
Panel A, Table 7 where the results of the private sector banks are given indicate that based on the 
averages for private banks there has been (ii) no growth in productivity and managerial 
efficiency, (ii) an annual growth rate of 1.6 percent in technical efficiency and (iii) a 1.6 percent 
per year negative growth in technological change. No growth in managerial efficiency indicates 
that the technical efficiency change in the private sector banks is entirely due to scale efficiency. 
Removal of various regulations since mid 1980s enabled private banks to progressively attain 
high levels of capacity utilisation. This might be one of the reasons for the lack of growth in 
managerial efficiency in the private sector banks during the sample time period.  
  The public sector banks indicate a picture different from the private sector banks. The results 
of the public sector banks are given in Panel B, Table 7. Here, in general there has been no 
change in technical, managerial and scale efficiency. There has been a 1.4 percent annual change 
in technical efficiency and this is fully reflected in the annual average TFP change which is 1.3 
percent.    19
  In terms of total factor productivity, we observe a small difference in the performance of the 
public and private sector banks. This difference is realised due to no TPF growth in private banks 
and a modest growth in public sector banks.
12 The modest growth in public sector banks indicates 
their slow response to deregulation.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The banking industry in India has been subjected to number of changes due to the 
deregulatory measures taken by the government and the industry. Changes in the national and 
international market environments, pressure applied by international organizations such as the 
IMF and the World Bank and the introduction of new technologies have forced authorities to 
relax controls making the banking industry more competitive and efficient. Beginning with 
deregulation policies introduced in mid 1990s to early 1990s, Indian banks have changed 
compared to the period before deregulation. It is obvious that changes are progressing well 
though slowly towards a more competitive banking industry in the region. For instance, increase 
in scale efficiency shows improvements within the banking industry due to deregulation. This 
would suggest that further steps need to be taken to improve efficiency in the banking industry 
substantially. As the public sector banks are dominating the market, it has become a difficult task 
for the private sector banks to change market and consumer attitudes swiftly. Further deregulation 
and more competition should be allowed within the banking sector for banks to become more 
efficient and productive. 
                                                 
12 Kumbakar and Sarkar (2003) report a larger difference in the TFP growth rates of the Indian private and 
public banks in the post-deregulation period compared to the pre-deregulation period. They used a 
generalized shadow cost function approach. In the literature however, it is argued that competition tends to 
narrow down the difference in performance of private and public banks (Caves and Christensen, 1980 and 
Borcherding, Pommerehne and Schneider , 1982).    
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          Table 1. Input-output variables used in previous studies  
Study Inputs Outputs Period 
      
Bhattacharyya, 









1986 - 1991 

































      
[Model B]  Deposits and 
number of staff 
members 




      
           
          Notes: 
# Saha and Ravisankar (2000) selected the input and output variables based on the thrust areas 
of Indian banking in the post-nationalisation period. In the analysis they adopt a two-stage approach 
where in the first stage the DEA analysis is carried out taking one input and two outputs from among 
those in the respective lists.  
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Table 2. Indian commercial banking at a glance -2002 
 
Name of the bank 


























State Bank of India  104,726,109  4,917,108  910,810  3.088  0.913  19.966  48.482 
Punjab National Bank  18,529,586  950,082  192,517  4.197  1.128  22.127  45.711 
ICICI Bank Limited  23,014,337  1,478,294  242,178  1.599  1.065  17.099  51.995 
Canara Bank  17,509,794  963,247  223,995  2.945  1.279  23.254  45.121 
Bank of Baroda  16,478,330  949,337  176,708  2.965  1.072  18.614  48.802 
Bank of India
#  16,114,988 744,643  178,969  2.895  1.162  26.653  44.819 
Union Bank of India
#  10,738,273 539,817  116,233  3.322  1.158  23.65  43.845 
Central Bank of India
#  12,009,498 509,770  64,252  3.738  0.557  13.822  62.308 
UCO Bank
#  7,342,604 253,554  43,636  2.911  0.643  18.727  58.162 
HDFC Bank Ltd
#  6,398,334 472,099  81,514  3.266  1.43  18.514  44.868 
 
Notes: The figures are from the BankScope database. 
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Table 3. Some summary statistics of input and output variables used in DEA 
 
Year  Statistic 
1995  1996  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
No banks   40  40  40  40  40  40  40  40 
Input variables 
Customer and short term funding (in thousands of US dollars) 
Median 795,593  952,047  1,081,766  1,229,308  1,598,486 1,752,036 1,895,854 2,064,937 
Minimum  4,870 63,211  72,727  81,729 101,988 113,469 122,971 103,964 
Maximum 8,514,486 9,308,215 10,353,443 11,181,446 11,379,387 11,471,409 12,921,787 14,401,792 
Mean 1,532,201  1,677,898  1,840,073  2,053,523  2,379,641 2,539,428 2,788,377 3,228,367 
%  change  - 9.51  9.67 11.60 15.88  6.71  9.80 15.78 
Total operating expense (in thousands of US dollars) 
Median  35,708  34,503 41,548 41,434 55,064 59,222 75,800 87,169 
Minimum  2,246  1,320 2,737 2,915 3,928 4,260 3,719 4,946 
Maximum  318,101  321,699 350,289 394,380 419,546 471,229 460,336 523,504 
Mean  73,583  66,443 67,189 73,603 84,191 98,913  104,960  121,217 
%  change  -  -9.70  1.12  9.55 14.39 17.49  6.11 15.49 
Output variables 
Loans (in thousands of US dollars) 
Median  414,768  504,266 558,953 634,771 805,491 922,779  87,169  1,152,414 
Minimum  16,059  34,250 37,919 38,601 42,968 52,605  4,946 36,986 
Maximum 4,542,907 5,106,341  5,574,866  5,737,505 6,033,586 6,898,186  523,504 8,965,975 
Mean  747,214  796,358  861,038  934,708 1,111,312 1,231,867  121,217 1,656,310 
%  change  - 6.58  8.12  8.56 18.89 10.85 15.49 19.18 
Other earning assets (in thousands of US dollars) 
Median  467,518  514,663 613,395 742,289 859,536 985,893  1,038,584  1,171,780 
Minimum  16,673  31,011 36,848 44,465 57,730 54,972 73,482 71,838 
Maximum 4,304,594 4,708,028  4,964,299  6,114,226 5,815,402 5,248,133 5,839,160 6,564,406 
Mean 860,261  979,724  1,083,770  1,239,203  1,420,494 1,466,023 1,568,783 1,809,821 
%  change  -  13.89 10.62 14.34 14.63  3.21  7.01 15.36 
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Table 4. Estimated DEA efficiency 
 
Variable returns-to-scale  Constant returns-to-scale 
Input orientation  Output orientation  Year 
Avg  Med  SD Q1 Q3  Avg  Med  SD Q1 Q3  Avg  Med  SD Q1 Q3 
Panel A: Private banks  n = 23 
1995 0.8570 0.8330  0.1139 0.7620 1.0000 0.9277 0.9260 0.0716 0.8570 1.0000 0.9307 0.9280 0.0674 0.8690 1.0000
1996 0.9177 0.8980  0.0513 0.8765 0.9480 0.9488 0.9510 0.0477 0.9035 1.0000 0.9507 0.9530 0.0460 0.9070 1.0000
1997 0.9547 0.9580  0.0355 0.9340 0.9855 0.9663 0.9740 0.0328 0.9470 1.0000 0.9662 0.9740 0.0328 0.9460 1.0000
1998 0.9405 0.9460  0.0397 0.9175 0.9655 0.9560 0.9590 0.0405 0.9325 1.0000 0.9564 0.9610 0.0405 0.9345 1.0000
1999 0.9293 0.9170  0.0458 0.9070 0.9625 0.9463 0.9470 0.0464 0.9180 0.9955 0.9472 0.9490 0.0459 0.9180 0.9965
2000 0.9408 0.9390  0.0521 0.9160 0.9940 0.9589 0.9860 0.0508 0.9315 1.0000 0.9588 0.9850 0.0506 0.9305 1.0000
2001 0.9240 0.9230  0.0544 0.8850 0.9640 0.9424 0.9570 0.0542 0.8995 1.0000 0.9416 0.9550 0.0549 0.8985 1.0000
2002 0.9356 0.9410  0.0564 0.9135 0.9795 0.9495 0.9720 0.0556 0.9260 1.0000 0.9486 0.9710 0.0564 0.9255 1.0000
Avg  0.9249   0.9495 0.9500     
Panel B: Public banks  n= 17 
1995 0.8251 0.8410  0.0927 0.7510 0.8950 0.9865 0.9960 0.0215 0.9810 1.0000 0.9872 0.9960 0.0208 0.9830 1.0000
1996 0.9158 0.9160  0.0406 0.8930 0.9400 0.9756 0.9990 0.0370 0.9700 1.0000 0.9764 0.9990 0.0362 0.9710 1.0000
1997 0.9524 0.9450  0.0310 0.9300 0.9810 0.9915 1.0000 0.0130 0.9820 1.0000 0.9918 1.0000 0.0127 0.9820 1.0000
1998 0.9469 0.9380  0.0404 0.9240 0.9890 0.9835 1.0000 0.0291 0.9880 1.0000 0.9842 1.0000 0.0277 0.9890 1.0000
1999 0.9252 0.9260  0.0390 0.8950 0.9510 0.9841 0.9980 0.0237 0.9740 1.0000 0.9856 0.9980 0.0205 0.9750 1.0000
2000 0.9343 0.9240  0.0481 0.8990 0.9780 0.9804 1.0000 0.0301 0.9710 1.0000 0.9825 1.0000 0.0258 0.9710 1.0000
2001 0.9410 0.9450  0.0539 0.8920 1.0000 0.9628 0.9830 0.0438 0.9360 1.0000 0.9652 0.9830 0.0405 0.9380 1.0000
2002 0.9551 0.9580  0.0423 0.9200 1.0000 0.9740 0.9960 0.0318 0.9430 1.0000 0.9749 0.9960 0.0311 0.9450 1.0000
Avg  0.9245   0.9798 0.9810     
Panel C: All banks  n = 40 
1995 0.8435 0.8370  0.1054 0.7585 0.9180 0.9527 0.9865 0.0628 0.9125 1.0000 0.9547 0.9885 0.0595 0.9083 1.0000   
1996 0.9169 0.9140  0.0465 0.8863 0.9400 0.9602 0.9855 0.0450 0.9108 1.0000 0.9616 0.9865 0.0435 0.9165 1.0000   
1997 0.9537 0.9540  0.0333 0.9308 0.9835 0.9770 0.9855 0.0289 0.9620 1.0000 0.9771 0.9860 0.0289 0.9623 1.0000   
1998 0.9432 0.9445  0.0396 0.9193 0.9680 0.9677 0.9835 0.0383 0.9448 1.0000 0.9682 0.9835 0.0379 0.9478 1.0000   
1999 0.9275 0.9210  0.0426 0.9038 0.9585 0.9624 0.9730 0.0425 0.9320 1.0000 0.9635 0.9745 0.0416 0.9330 1.0000   
2000 0.9380 0.9375  0.0499 0.9043 0.9825 0.9681 0.9935 0.0441 0.9473 1.0000 0.9689 0.9930 0.0431 0.9500 1.0000   
2001 0.9312 0.9280  0.0542 0.8890 0.9985 0.9511 0.9625 0.0505 0.9058 1.0000 0.9516 0.9640 0.0501 0.9110 1.0000   
2002 0.9439 0.9415  0.0512 0.9188 0.9963 0.9599 0.9745 0.0480 0.9378 1.0000 0.9598 0.9740 0.0486 0.9398 1.0000   
Avg  0.9247   0.9624 0.9632      27
Table 5. Composition of the production frontiers (1995-2002) with CRS specification  
Bank Type  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  Count 
Federal Bank Ltd  Private     b       1  
ING Vysya Bank Ltd  Private  b         1  
Global Trust Bank Ltd  Private  b         1  
Indusind Bank Limited  Private  b        b   2 
Bank of Punjab Ltd  Private  b  b        2  
SBI Commercial & International Bank  Private   b     b     2 
Jammu and Kashmir Bank Ltd  Private        b  b  b  3 
Karur Vysya Bank Ltd  Private        b  b  b  3 
Centurian Bank Ltd  Private  b  b  b       3  
Lakshmi Vilas Bank Ltd  Private        b  b  b  3 
Uti Bank  Private     b  b  b  b    b  5 
IDBI Bank Ltd  Private  b  b  b  b  b     5 
HDFC Bank Ltd  Private  b    b  b  b  b  b  b  7 
Punjab & Sind Bank  Private                    
Karnataka Bank Ltd  Private                    
South Indian Bank Ltd  Private                    
Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd  Private                    
Catholic Syrian Bank Ltd  Private                    
City Union Bank Ltd  Private                    
Bharat Overseas Bank Ltd  Private                    
Dhanalakshmi Bank Ltd  Private                    
Lord Krishna Bank ltd  Private                    
Ratnakar Bank Ltd  Private                    
Bank of India  Public          b  1 
State Bank of Saurashtra  Public       b      1  
State Bank of Hyderabad  Public         b  b  2 
State Bank of Mysore  Public         b  b  2 
State Bank of Patiala  Public     b     b  b   3 
State Bank of Travancore  Public       b    b  b  b  4 
State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur  Public   b  b    b  b  b  b  6 
Central Bank of India  Public                    
Union Bank of India  Public                    
Indian Overseas Bank  Public                    
UCO Bank  Public                    
Syndicate Bank  Public                    
Oriental Bank of Commerce Ltd  Public                    
Bank of Maharashtra  Public                    
United Bank of India  Public                    
Dena Bank  Public                    
State Bank of Indore  Public                    
Number  of  banks  n  =  40  7 5 7 5 5 8  10  10   
 
Notes: The banks corresponding to the shaded regions have not been efficient in any year in the sample 




Table 6. Composition of the production frontiers (1995-2002) with VRS specification (output  
              orientation)  
Bank Type  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Count 
ING Vysya Bank Ltd  Private  b         1  
Global Trust Bank Ltd  Private  b         1  
City Union Bank Ltd  Private          1 
Bank of Punjab Ltd  Private  b  b        2  
Lakshmi Vilas Bank Ltd  Private        b    b  2 
Indusind Bank Limited  Private  b       b  b   3 
Karur Vysya Bank Ltd  Private        b  b  b  3 
Jammu and Kashmir Bank Ltd  Private      b    b  b  b  4 
Centurian Bank Ltd  Private  b  b  b      b   4 
Federal Bank Ltd  Private  b  b  b  b  b    5 
IDBI Bank Ltd  Private  b  b  b  b  b     5 
Uti Bank  Private  b  b  b  b  b    b  6 
HDFC Bank Ltd  Private  b    b  b  b  b  b  b  7 
Ratnakar Bank Ltd  Private  b  b  b  b  b  b  b  b  8 
SBI Commercial & International Bank  Private  b  b  b  b  b  b  b  b  8 
Punjab & Sind Bank  Private                   
Karnataka Bank Ltd  Private                   
South Indian Bank Ltd  Private                   
Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd  Private                   
Catholic Syrian Bank Ltd  Private                   
Bharat Overseas Bank Ltd  Private                   
Dhanalakshmi Bank Ltd  Private                   
Lord Krishna Bank ltd  Private                   
Bank of Maharashtra  Public  b         1  
Dena Bank  Public       b      1  
State Bank of Saurashtra  Public       b      1  
Syndicate Bank  Public  b      b     2 
State Bank of Mysore  Public         b  b  2 
Indian Overseas Bank  Public  b  b  b       3  
Union Bank of India  Public   b  b  b    b    b  5 
UCO Bank  Public  b  b  b  b    b    5 
United Bank of India  Public   b  b  b  b  b    5 
State Bank of Patiala  Public     b    b  b  b  b  5 
State Bank of Travancore  Public       b  b  b  b  b  5 
State Bank of Hyderabad  Public  b    b  b    b  b  b  6 
Central Bank of India  Public   b  b  b  b  b  b  b  7 
Oriental Bank of Commerce Ltd  Public  b  b  b  b  b  b  b   7 
State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur  Public  b  b  b    b  b  b  b  7 
Bank of India  Public  b  b  b  b  b  b  b  b  8 
State Bank of Indore  Public                    
Number of banks  n  =  40 17 15 17 17 14 20 15 15   
 
Note: The banks corresponding to the shaded regions have not been efficient in any year in the 





















Panel A: Private banks 
1996  1.110 0.924 1.024 1.084 1.026 
1997  1.032 0.955 1.007 1.025 0.986 
1998  0.980 1.014 0.985 0.995 0.994 
1999  0.996 1.018 1.008 0.988 1.014 
2000  1.018 0.969 1.001 1.017 0.986 
2001  0.989 0.992 0.988 1.001 0.981 
2002  0.990 1.024 0.994 0.996 1.014 
Geometric 
mean  1.016 0.984 1.001 1.015 1.000 
Panel B: Public banks 
1996  0.997 1.069 0.993 1.005 1.066 
1997  1.014 0.999 1.014 1.000 1.012 
1998  0.989 1.005 0.991 0.998 0.994 
1999  0.989 1.024 1.001 0.988 1.013 
2000  0.995 0.979 1.000 0.995 0.974 
2001  0.996 1.023 0.991 1.004 1.019 
2002  1.010 1.003 1.005 1.006 1.013 
Geometric 
mean  0.999 1.014 0.999 0.999 1.013 
Panel C: All banks 
1996  1.094 0.967 1.008 1.085 1.058 
1997  1.041 0.956 1.017 1.024 0.995 
1998  0.989 1.007 0.991 0.998 0.995 
1999  0.983 1.026 0.995 0.988 1.009 
2000  1.011 0.976 1.006 1.005 0.987 
2001  0.992 0.994 0.982 1.011 0.986 
2002  1.014 1.001 1.009 1.005 1.015 
Geometric 
mean  1.017 0.989 1.001 1.016 1.006 
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